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KEY TO HEALTH CARE REFORM:
CHANGING HOW CARE IS DELIVERED
STEPHEN M. SHORTELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
History will record that the singular achievement of the
Obama administration was passage of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)' of 2010, which extended health
insurance coverage to thirty two million more Americans,
encompassing near-universal coverage for all citizens.2 The
United States was the last industrialized country to do so.
Whether history will also record that such coverage could be sus-
tained over time and at an affordable cost to the American public
is an open question. As other contributors to this Issue have
noted,' the PPACA contains relatively few provisions for control-
ling the rising costs of health care. These costs are almost certain
to grow given the likely increase in demand on the part of those
with the new and/or expanded financial coverage.
* Ph.D., University of Chicago; MBA, University of Chicago; MPH, Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles; BBA, University of Notre Dame. Dr. Shortell
is the Blue Cross of California Distinguished Professor of Health Policy and
Management, School of Public Health and Haas School of Business, and Dean,
School of Public Health, University of California-Berkeley.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.,
26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PPACA]. For ease of refer-
ence, PPACA as used here also includes amendments made to it by the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029.
2. See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office,
to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representative, at tbl.2
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf
(Preliminary Estimate of the Direct Spending and Revenue Effects of an
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 4872, the Reconciliation Act
of 2010).
3. See, e.g., Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., Rational Health Care Reform: Reflections
of a Practitioner, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 387 (2011); Clark C.
Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Who Pays , Who Benefits? Unfairness in American
Health Care, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 493 (2011); Newt Ging-
rich & Vincent L. Frakes, Incomplete Reform: How the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act Fails to Achieve True Health Transformation, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 329 (2011); Paul Ryan, Health Care Reform: The Way Forward, 25
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 337 (2011).
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The concern is not just with the growing cost of care but also
with assessing the impact of expanded coverage on the quality
and outcomes of care, including patients' experience with their
care. Currently, while we spend more than any other country in
the world (seventeen percent of GDP, or $2.7 trillion) most of
our health statistics, such as life expectancy and infant mortality,
along with patient satisfaction scores, are generally in the lower
half of industrialized countries.' Thus, successful health care
reform must address this "triple aim": improving the quality, out-
comes, and experience of care for patients; improving the overall
health of the population; and slowing the growth of health care
costs. 5
The PPACA does contain a few provisions that begin to
address the "triple aim." These include the following: the estab-
lishment of a Shared Savings Program within Medicare for the
creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs);6 the estab-
lishment of an Innovation Center within CMS to stimulate new
payment and organizational models, such as patient-centered
medical homes;' and funds for the adoption and implementa-
tion of electronic health records in hospitals and physician prac-
tices.' The PPACA also establishes an Independent Payment
Advisory Board (IPAB).' The Board is authorized to reduce pay-
ments to doctors and hospitals if health care expenditures
exceed the overall growth in the GDP by greater than one
percent.
The key to avoiding these potentially draconian cuts lies in
the extent to which patient care can be delivered in a more cost-
effective way (that is, with greater value) than currently occurs.
Can hospitals, physicians, and other health professionals organ-
ize themselves in such a way as to respond to the new payment
incentives that reward outcomes of care and not volume of pro-
cedures or services delivered? Can they adopt and use electronic
health records to interact more continuously with their patients,
4. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2011, HEALTH AND NUTRITION, at 99 tbl.130 (2011), http://www.census.gov/
prod/2011pubs/11statab/health.pdf; DEP'T OF ECONOMIc & SocAL AFFAIRS,
UNITED NATIONS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECrs: THE 2006 REVISION 80-89
(2007), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/
WPP2006_Highlights-rev.pdf.
5. Donald M. Berwick, Thomas W. Nolan & John Whittington, The Triple
Aim: Care, Health, and Costs, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 759-69 (2008).
6. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395-99 (2010).
7. Id. § 10306, 124 Stat. at 939-40.
8. Id. § 2041, 124 Stat. at 791-94 (establishing the "Certified EHR Tech-
nology Grant Program").
9. Id. § 3403, 124 Stat. at 489-507.
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to receive feedback on results to improve care, to share informa-
tion with each other, and to provide data to external parties-
including the public at large-for purposes of accountability?
Can physicians learn to work effectively in teams within real and
virtual organizations? Can state professional practice laws be
changed to allow competency-based licensing for nurses, physi-
cian assistants, and new types of community health workers, to
provide services now restricted to only physicians? Answers to
these and related questions will involve fundamental changes in
hospital behavior, physician behavior, and patient behavior as
these groups interact within the context of regulatory and legal
policies and continual advances in medical technology. To
address this challenge, an organizing framework based on an
understanding of incentives, capabilities, and accountability is
needed. This framework may be expressed as: INCENTIVESlo X
CAPABILITIES" + ACCOUNTABILITY' 2 = FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY.
II. THE FRAMEwoRK: INCENTIVES
The dominant form of payment for physicians is fee for ser-
vice; for hospitals, it is a set amount based on a given diagnosis
called a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG). Simply put, physicians
make more money for more services, tests, visits, treatments, and
drugs prescribed. Hospitals make more money the more
patients they admit; although some are, of course, more "profita-
ble" than others, depending on the DRG rate established for a
given condition. There is no incentive to contain costs or to
refrain from providing care that may not be supported by the
best evidence. Patient pressure and legal concerns often result
in the practice of "defensive medicine" on the part of many phy-
sicians." Most importantly, fee for service creates no incentive
for physicians to do things differently; to learn from each other;
to try new approaches to care that might provide greater value to
patients. Thus, a major provision for change in the PPACA is to
move away from fee for service payment and toward paying physi-
cians and hospitals based on creating a common set of economic
incentives, such as bundled payments for given conditions, epi-
10. See supra Part II.
11. See infra Part Ill.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See Catherine A. Martin & Tamara R. Tenney, Preparing for Quality-
Based Payments: Trends and Legal Barriers to Successful Implementation, 2 J. HEALTH
& LIFE Sci. L. 1, 3 (2009) ("[T]he pervasive risks of malpractice litigation, from
both a financial and reputational perspective, may encourage physicians to
order more tests and services than medically indicated.").
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sode of care-based payments, partial capitation payments, and
total capitation payments.
Bundled payment involves the establishment of a fixed pay-
ment to both hospitals and physicians for treating patients for a
given condition, such as total hip replacement, total knee
replacement, or coronary artery bypass graft surgery.' 4 By estab-
lishing such an umbrella payment, hospitals and physicians have
every incentive to work together across the entire episode of ill-
ness, including pre-hospital care, hospital care, and post-dis-
charge care. Provided established quality criteria are met,
hospitals and physicians will then share in any savings that result
from providing the care below the negotiated rate. To the extent
possible, the negotiated rates would take into account differ-
ences in patient severity of illness and regional differences across
the country in the cost of living index and other inputs into the
provision of medical services.
Episode of illness-based payment results in a single payment
for managing the care of patients with specific conditions-such
as diabetes or asthma-whether or not such conditions involve
hospitalization." Again, providers who can manage a given pop-
ulation of patients with these conditions within a set episode-
based payment would receive savings, provided that selected
quality criteria are met.
In capitated payment, providers receive payment per mem-
ber or per patient, per month.' 6 In partial capitation, the pay-
ment may be based only on ambulatory care, only on hospital
care, or only for certain conditions, but not for the total amount
of care for all conditions. In total capitation, the payment to
providers is established for the entire population of patients to
be treated for all conditions. In effect, for a given provider
organization, total capitation for all patients based on all care
amounts to a global budget for that organization.
These new forms of payment, moving away from fee for ser-
vice, represent a landmark change in American health care deliv-
ery and payment. Incentives are created for providers to manage
the health of their patients and to assume the risk, in varying
degrees, of being able to provide quality care within the financial
incentives. Providers are no longer rewarded for the amount of
care they provide but rather for providing the most cost-effective
care based on current knowledge and best judgment.
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4 (West Supp. 2011).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4(a)(2)(D)(i) (West Supp. 2011).
16. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2705, 124 Stat. 119, 324-25 (2010).
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Additional incentives include paying more for achievinq
high quality scores and/or improvements in quality over time.'
Such "pay for performance" programs have generally been asso-
ciated with modest gains in quality." They also depend greatly
on a number of implementation issues, including the number
and types of measures used, the ability to take into account dif-
ferences in patient severity of illness and differences in socioeco-
nomic and cultural backgrounds, and the amount of dollars
needed to incentivize changes in behavior." Public reporting of
cost and quality data and formal recognition and reward pro-
grams can also serve as incentives for changing behavior.20
III. THE FRAMEwoRK: CAPABILITIES
Changes in incentives alone will do little to change behavior.
Hospitals, physicians, other health professionals, and patients
themselves also need the capability to respond to the new incen-
tives. There is great variance across the United States in the abil-
ity of these groups to respond. Many hospitals, including those
belonging to large multi-hospital systems, still lack electronic
health records,2 1 particularly in the ability to track patients after
they are discharged from the hospital. The majority of physi-
cians still work in solo practices, partnerships, or small groups of
five or fewer doctors.22 Most of these, and even many of the
larger physician organizations, lack the necessary capital, finan-
17. See, e.g., Id. § 3001, 124 Stat. at 353-63; Id. § 3006, 124 Stat. at 372-73;
Id. § 3007, 124 Stat. at 373-76; Id. § 10326, 124 Stat. at 961-62.
18. Cheryl L. Damberg et al., Taking Stock OfPay-For-Performance: A Candid
Assessment From The Front Lines, 28 HEALTH AFF. 517, 517-25 (2009).
19. Meredith B. Rosenthal & R. Adams Dudley, Pay-for-Performance: Will the
Latest Trend Improve Care?, 297 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 740, 740-44 (2007).
20. For examples of ranking systems that are based on disclosed informa-
tion, see NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, NCQA's HEALTH INSURANCE
PLAN RANKINus 2010-2011 (2010), http://www.ncqa.org/portals/0/health%20
plan%20rankings/2010/HPR201 0_PlanRankingSummary ReportPrivatel0.
26.pdf (assessing the performance of health plans in 2010); Hospital Compare,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov
(last visited May 23, 2011); State Scorecard, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/Maps-and-Data/State-Data-Center/State-Score
card.aspx (last visited May 23, 2011); THE DARTMOUTH ATLAs OF HEALTHCARE,
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org (last visited May 23, 2011).
21. For more information about issues related to medical health records,
see Jacqueline Klosek, Exploring the Barriers to the More Widespread Adoption ofElec-
tronic Health Records, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 429 (2011).
22. See ESTHER HING & CATHARINE W. BURT, NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE-BASED MEDICAL PRAC,
TICES: METHODS AND ESrIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL AMBULATORY MEDICAL
CARE SURVEY (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad383.pdf.
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cial, organizational, leadership, and managerial expertise to
make the necessary changes.
To address this fragmentation in the current delivery system,
PPACA contains provisions for the creation of Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs)2 ' and incentive payments for supporting
Patient Centered Medical Homes (PCMHs).24 Accountable Care
Organizations are entities that accept responsibility for the qual-
ity and cost of all care provided to a given population of patients
and that provide data on performance. PPACA requires that
they provide care to a population of at least five thousand. Pro-
vider organizations enter into contracts for at least three years
and have a designated administrative/legal governance structure
for accepting payment and distributing such payment to provid-
ers. Most ACOs will include physician practices and at least one
hospital, and many will probably include nursing homes, home
health agencies, and other provider organizations. Specific
examples include integrated delivery systems, such as the Califor-
nia-based Kaiser Permanente,2 5 the Henry Ford Health System in
Detroit,26 and the Geisinger Health System in Western Penn-
sylvania;" multi-specialty group practices, such as the Mayo
Clinic28 and the Cleveland Clinic; Physician Hospital Organiza-
tions (PHOs), such as Advocate Health Care in Chicago,o Ban-
ner in Phoenix," and Middlesex in Middleton, Connecticut;
and independent practice associations, such as the Hill Physi-
cians Group in Northern California" and Health Partners34 and
23. PPACA. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395-99 (2010).
24. Id. § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395-99; Id. § 3502, 124 Stat. at 513-15.
25. KAISER PERMANENTE, https://www.kaiserpermanente.org (last visited
May 23, 2011).
26. HENRY FoRD HEALTH SYSTEM, http://www.henryfordhealth.org (last
visited May 23, 2011).
27. GEISINGER HEALTH SYSTEM, http://www.geisinger.org (last visited May
23, 2011).
28. MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org (last visited May 23, 2011).
29. CLEVELAND CLINIC, http://my.clevelandclinic.org/default.aspx (last
visited May 23, 2011).
30. ADVocATE HEALTH CARE, http://www.advocatehealth.com/default.
cfm (last visited May 23, 2011).
31. BANNER GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER, http://www.banner
health.com/Locations/Arizona/Banner+Good+Samaritan+Medical+Center/
Banner+Good+Samaritan+Medical+Center+Home.htm (last visited May 23,
2011).
32. MIDDLESEx HOSPITAL, http://middlesexhospital.org (last visited May
23, 2011).
33. HILL PHYSICIANs, http://www.hillphysicians.com/Pages/Default.aspx
(last visited May 23, 2011).
34. HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, http://www.healthcarepartners.com (last vis-
ited May 23, 2011).
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Monarch in Southern California" along with more loosely
organized "virtual" organizations similar to Community Care of
North Carolina." A major issue for ACOs will be to work out the
distribution of power and influence among hospitals, primary
care physicians, and specialists in making important decisions
regarding all aspects of ACO operation and resources.
A key factor in the likely success of the ACO concept will be
the ability to manage patient-care risk under new financial incen-
tives. Rather than an "approve/not approve" or "one-size-fits-all"
set of rules and regulations for establishing ACOs, it may be bet-
ter to establish three different tiers which appropriately recog-
nize the different ability of current providers to respond to the
financial incentives." At entry Level 1, providers might partici-
pate in a shared savings program in which there is relatively little
or no downside risk. They would receive shared-saving bonuses if
they met quality benchmarks and reduced per-member spending
below the agreed-upon target. They would be required to report
a basic set of performance measures based largely on available
administrative data.
Level 2 ACOs would be eligible to receive a greater propor-
tion of savings below target but also be at risk for spending above
the target. In addition, they would be eligible for bundled pay-
ments for certain conditions and partial capitation payments.
They would be required to provide a more comprehensive set of
performance measures, including patient experience and clinical
performance data for defined chronic illnesses. Given the
increased level of risk involved, they would also be required to
meet specific standards for financial reporting, including cash
reserves and financial projections.
High Level 3 ACOs could be reimbursed through a greater
percentage of patients covered by partial capitated payments, a
greater set of conditions for which bundled payments are used,
or be paid by total capitation. In return, they would be required
to publicly report a comprehensive set of performance measures
35. MONARCH HEALTHCARE, http://www.monarchhealthcare.com (last
visited May 23, 2011).
36. COMMUNITY CARE OF NORTH CAROLINA, http://www.community
carenc.com (last visited May 23, 2011).
37. See William B. Weeks et al., Higher Health Care Quality and Bigger Say-
ings Found at Large Multispeciality Medical Groups, 29 HEALTH Ave. 991, 996
(2010). See generally PARTNERS IN HEALTH: How PHYSICIANS AND HosPrrALs CAN
BE ACCourABLE TOGETHER (Francis J. Crosson & Laura A. Tollen eds., 2010).
38. See Stephen M. Shortell, Lawrence P. Casalino & Elliott S. Fisher, How
The Center For Medicare And Medicaid Innovation Should Test Accountable Care Orga-
nizations, 29 HEALTH Ave. 1293, 1295-96 (2010).
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drawn largely from electronic health records that would include
health-related outcomes and quality of life indicators. They
would also be required to meet more stringent standards for
financial reporting and would be required to hold larger cash
reserves. The key idea behind this proposal is to match the capa-
bilities of the evolving delivery system with the degree of risk
assumed. Practices could begin at low levels of developing the
needed capabilities and advance to higher levels over time with
the associated risk-reward relationship adjusted accordingly.
There is an emerging body of evidence that at least certain
types of ACOs can provide more cost-effective care, more preven-
tive care, more recommended elements of care for patients with
chronic illness, demonstrate greater improvement over time in
the use of recommended care management processes, and pro-
vide higher quality of care than other care delivery systems in the
same market area." There appears to be no single formula or
"silver bullet" associated with the success of these organizations.
Rather, some common elements appear to be: depth of physician
leadership;4 0 a culture focused on meeting patient needs;4 1 the
ability to deliver care in teams (including nurse practitioners,
physician assistants, pharmacists, social workers, nutritionists,
and others);42 and the ability to redesign the practice of
medicine through the use of various quality improvement sys-
tems and engineering tools, such as statistical process control,
Plan, Do, Study and Act (PDSA) cycles, quality functional deploy-
ment, lean production, and the growing implementation of elec-
tronic health records.4 3
ACOs also emphasize managing care between visits with use
of the electronic medical record. Other mechanisms used
include home-based monitoring, home-based caregivers, and
39. See Robin R. Gillies et al., The Impact of Health Plan Delivery System on
Clinical Quality and Patient Satisfaction, 41 HEALTH SERVICEs REs. 1181 (2006);
Stephen M. Shortell et al., Improving Chronic Illness Care: A Longitudinal Cohort
Analysis of Large Physician Organizations, 27 MED. CARE (2009); Weeks, supra note
37.
40. See, e.g., RobertJ. Reid, The Group Health Medical Home at Year Two: Cost
Savings, Higher Patient Satisfaction, and Less Burnout for Providers, 29 HEALTH Ave.
835, 836, 841 (2010).
41. See, e.g., Ronald A. Paulus, Karen Davis & Glenn D. Steele, Continuous
Innovation In Health Care: Implications Of The Geisinger Experience, 27 HEALTH AFF.
1235, 1237, 1239-42 (2008); Reid, supra note 40, at 835.
42. See, e.g., Gillies, supra note 39, at 1183-84,1193; Weeks, supra note 37,
at 996.
43. See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 41, at 1239; Reid, supra note 40, at 836,
841.
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telemedicine linkages, particularly in rural areas." There is also
emerging evidence that PCMHs provide higher quality care at
the same or lower cost than the current, largely fragmented, sys-
tem of providers."
Most ACOs will be based on the foundation of Patient Cen-
tered Medical Homes. PCMHs are comprised of primary care
physicians who take responsibility for providing comprehensive,
coordinated care to patients for the entire continuum of care,
working with specialists and other providers as needed. Under
PPACA, they would be paid additional money for providing such
care coordination and could also qualify for additional bonus
payments for meeting quality targets.4 6
There are many challenges to the development of ACOs and
PCMHs beyond matching payment incentives to the degree of
risk that these organizations are able to bear. These include:
how patients are to be linked or attributed to ACOs or PCMHs;
patient acceptance of these new forms of organization; and a
number of legal and regulatory barriers. Regarding patient
linkage, each patient might be given a choice of provider, with
most undoubtedly selecting a physician with whom they currently
have a personal relationship. For the currently uninsured, and
those without a designated personal physician, assignment could
be made based on the provider from which the person has
received the majority of their care. Systems that care for the
uninsured, such as public hospitals and Federally Qualified
Health Centers, could create safety net ACOs that could facilitate
the assignment process. The question that arises is whether
patients would be allowed to seek care outside their designated
ACO. One approach would be for patients to be "locked in" for
one year and then be free to choose a different ACO at the end
of the year. If, for a given condition, a specific ACO cannot pro-
vide the care to the patient, a referral outside of the ACO net-
work would be needed. In such cases, the "home-base" ACO
would still be responsible for the overall cost and quality of care
for the patient. This would create appropriate incentives for the
ACO to choose referral physicians that meet desired cost and
quality criteria.
44. Arnold Milstein & Elizabeth Gilbertson, American Medical Home Runs,
28 HEALTH Ave. 1317 (2009).
45. See Paulus, supra note 41; Reid, supra note 40; Beat D. Steiner, Commu-
nity Care of North Carolina: Improving Care Through Community Health Networks, 6
ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 361 (2008).
46. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395-99 (2010). See
also Diane R. Rittenhouse & Stephen M. Shortell, The Patient-Centered Medical
Home: Will It Stand the Test of Health Reform?, 301 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 2038 (2009).
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The second challenge involves promoting public acceptance
of ACOs. The problem arises because of patient and public reac-
tion to the managed care of the late 1990s in which insurers
often required prior approval for a number of procedures and
services, and for referrals to specialists.47 If ACOs are simply seen
as a new version of "cost cutting" by managed care organizations,
there is likely to be a repeat of prior negative reaction. Thus, it
will be important to communicate that ACOs are being created
to better meet the needs of patients, to better coordinate care
across the entire continuum of care that is needed, and to be
paid based on the quality of the results achieved in addition to
the ability to slow the increase in costs. Advances in the ability to
measure the patients' experience with their care and to measure
aspects of the technical quality of care along with the emergence
of electronic health records make it more possible to demon-
strate the benefits of such care than was possible ten or fifteen
years ago.
There are also a number of legal and regulatory barriers,
particularly in regard to ACO formation. These include antitrust
laws" and Stark laws against kickbacks and referrals to organiza-
tions in which physicians may have an economic interest.4 9
There is concern that as physicians group together to form larger
entities, they will have greater ability to set prices, particularly in
their negotiations with private insurers. Providers that can meet
financial integration criteria involving the sharing of substantial
financial risk and clinical integration criteria regarding the coor-
dination and quality of care may be able to proceed with their
plans. But these criteria will need to be defined by the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
Current anti-kickback statutes prohibit physicians and hospi-
tals from entering into financial relationships that might induce
the referral of patients to the hospital.o Center for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Inspector General's office have
47. See generally RAND HEALTH, FACT SHEET, THE MANAGED CARE BACK-
LASH: DID CONSUMERS VOTE WITH THEIR FEET? (2005), http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research-briefs/2005/RAND_- RB9121.pdf.
48. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (2006); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
49. See Stark Law, 42 C.F.R. § 411.350-411.389 (2010).
50. See STEPHEN M. SHORTELL, LAWRENCE P. CASALINO & EuioTT FISHER,
BERKELEY CTR. ON HEALTH, ECON. & FAMILY SEC., ADVANCING NATIONAL HEALTH
REFORM POLICY SERIES: IMPLEMENTING ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS
(2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/chefs/Implementing-ACOsMay
2010.pdf; Maria T. Currier & Morris H. Miller, Medicare Payment Reform: Accelerat-
ing the Transformation of the U.S. Health Care Delivery System and Need for New Strate-
gic Provider Alliances, 22 HEALTH LAw. 1 (2010).
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the authority to create safe harbors, but how these will be imple-
mented remains to be seen." In addition, seven states (Califor-
nia, Colorado, Texas, Illinois, Iowa, New York, and New Jersey)
have corporate practice of medicine laws preventing hospitals
from employing physicians in the provision of out-patient ser-
vices.5 2 These laws will constrain the forms that ACOs may take
in those states. Further, as previously noted, practice and licens-
ing laws will need to be re-examined if full use is to be made of
the emerging competencies of non-physician health profession-
als, such as nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and commu-
nity health workers.
To address the above and related challenges, considerable
technical assistance will be needed in many physician practices
and community hospitals across the country. Such help may
come not only from private sector consulting firms and quality
improvement organizations, such as Boston-based Institute for
Health Care Improvement," but also from creative approaches
which link current well-established ACOs, such as some of the
country's leading integrated delivery systems and multi-specialty
group practices, with less developed practices throughout the
country. For example, such organizations might receive techni-
cal assistance payments from CMS for partnering with organiza-
tions requiring assistance in developing an effectively-
functioning ACO. This "twinning" idea is currently being
explored by some organizations throughout the country, includ-
ing the Council of Accountable Physician Practices made up of
more than thirty of the country's leading multi-specialty group
practices.54
IV. THE FRAMEwolu: AccouNrABH.YTy
The third component of the framework for fundamentally
changing health care delivery is accountability. Accountability
has both an internal dimension for purposes of providing feed-
back to continuously improve care and an external component
51. Safe Harbor for Federally Qualified Health Centers Arrangements
Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 C.F.R. § 1001 (2007).
52. See MARY H. MICHAL ET AL., CTR. TO ADVANCE PALLIATIVE CARE, CORPO-
RATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE: 50 STATE SURVEY SUMMARY (2006), http:/
/www.nhpco.org/files/public/palliativecare/corporate-practice-of-medicine-
50-state-summary.pdf.
53. About Us, INsrlTUTE FOR HEALTH CARE IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.
org/ihi/about (last visited May 23, 2011).
54. Stephen M. Shortell, Lawrence P. Casalino & Elliott S. Fisher, How the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation Should Test Accountable Care Organiza-
tions, 29 HEALTH Ave. 1293 (2010).
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related to providing the basis for results-based payment, recogni-
tion, and review by external bodies. Key questions become
accountability to whom, for what, and how?55 In regard to the
"whom" question, ACOs and PCMHs have multiple stakeholders,
including patients, payers, and the public at large. In regard to
"what," the relevant dimensions are cost, clinical process, and
outcome measures of care and patients' experience with care. A
reliable and valid portfolio of measures is emerging to provide
such assessment.56
In regard to "how," major reliance must be placed on the
further diffusion of electronic health records to be able to pro-
vide both real time data to physicians and their patients as well as
data that can be stored and aggregated up to various levels of
accountability. Aggregation levels could include: individual
patients; groups of patients in a practice or within an ACO or
PCMH; groups of patients within a given market, region or state;
and ultimately patients on a nationwide basis. This capability will
emerge slowly and will require national agreement on data plat-
forms, open source technologies, and standardization. Only
through a well-defined, transparent system of accountability, will
the American public and the various stakeholders involved be
able to determine whether or not the goals of health care reform
are being achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
Incentives, capabilities, and accountability provide a frame-
work for thinking about and assessing the extent to which funda-
mental changes in how health care is delivered in the United
States can be achieved. The framework underscores the com-
plexity of the processes involved and the overall need for align-
ment among incentives, capabilities, and accountability. It also
provides a basis for developing an evaluation framework for
tracking the progress of delivery system reform over time. Data
from multiple sources will be needed to assess the impact of
55. Elliott S. Fisher & Stephen M. Shortell, Accountable Care Organizations:
Accountable for What, to Whom, and How, 304J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1715 (2010).
56. See INST. OF MED., PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: ACCELERATING
IMPROVEMENT (2005), http://www.iom.edu/-/media/Files/Report%20Files/
2005/Performance-Measurement-Accelerating-Improvement/ReportBriefPer-
formanceMeasurementAcceleratinglmprovement.pdf; NAT'L QuAuTY FORUM,
MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORIC EVALUATING EFFICIENCIES ACROSS PATIENT-FOCUSED
EPISODES OF CARE (2009), available at http://www.qualityforum.org/Publica
tions/2010/01/MeasurementFramework EvaluatingEfficiencyAcross
Patient-FocusedEpisodes of Care.aspx (follow "Download the Publication"
hyperlink).
KEY TO HEALTH CARE REFORM
changes in payment incentives on the capabilities of ACOs,
PCMHs, and related entities to deliver more cost-effective care to
various populations across the country.
It is unlikely that results will come quickly. Most likely, it will
take three to five years to lay the new foundation for health care
delivery that incorporates the essential incentives, capabilities,
and accountability. At that point, we may be able to see some
significant, measurable improvements in quality of care and a
diminishing percentage increase in the growth of the cost of
care. Whether or not we will have the patience or can afford to
wait this long remains an open question. As Atul Gawande
wrote, "[O]ne truly scary thing about health care reform: far
from being a government takeover, it counts on local communi-
ties and clinicians for success. We are the ones to determine
whether costs are controlled and health care improves . . . .""
57. LAURA A. TOLLEN ET AL., KAISER PERMANENTE INST. FOR HEALTH POL-
iy & THE COMMONWEALTH FuND, DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM TRACKING: A FRAME-
WORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CHANGE (forthcoming 2011).
58. Atul Gawande, Now What?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 5, 2010, at 21.
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